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The Use of Examples 
 
One of the most important problems for a study of symbolic practices (pictorial, 
verbal or other) is the choice of a language of description that is general enough to 
allow for comparisons between different symbolic practices and specific enough to 
allow for meaningful descriptions of actual practices. I will argue that Goodman’s 
theory of symbols provides some of the categories needed for such an analysis.  
I will try to indicate this by looking at Goodman’s analysis of a symbolic 
practice that – though widely used in many different kinds of discourse – has 
generally not received much attention: the giving of examples. Goodman’s 
extensional description of exemplification allows us to differentiate between various 
types of examples and to determine what we mean when we say that examples ‘show’ 
something. In this way, conflicting approaches to the question of examples (namely 
Kant and Wittgenstein) can be seen as complementary. A theory of symbols can 
operate these clarifications by virtue of its strict extensionalism.  
 
I. An Extensional Approach to the Description of Symbolic Practices 
One of the most important problems for a study of symbolic practices (pictorial, verbal or 
other) is the choice of a language of description that is general enough to allow for 
comparisons between different symbolic practices and specific enough to allow for 
meaningful descriptions of actual practices. I will argue that Goodman’s theory of symbols 
provides some of the categories needed for such an analysis.  
My argument will touch upon – but not consider in detail – a certain number of general 
questions: What is it that a general theory of symbols contributes to the study of symbolic 
practices? What is its relation to the categories used by the respective specialists in fields as 
different as cultural studies, literary theory, sociology or visual studies? What kind of 
questions will such a general theory of symbols be able to raise and what kind of answers can 
it provide? What kind of objects does it describe?  
The defining characteristic of Goodman’s theory of symbols is its extensionalism: all relations 
are to be expressed in terms of reference. The syntactic and semantic differences Goodman 
introduces in order to distinguish between symbol systems are differences in the mode and 
direction of reference, in the way referential chains are organized etc. These distinctions have 
sometimes been read as characteristics of static (‘Saussurean’) systems (see e.g. Mitchell 
1994: 347ff.). The following analyses imply that this is not the case: a theory of symbols does 
not describe the inherent qualities of objects, but the different ways we use them as symbols 
(see Stetter 2005). This essentially pragmatic reading of Goodman also entails that a general 
theory of symbols cannot and should not replace specialist discourses, on the contrary: a 
theory of symbols can determine the formal characteristics of a variation, but it takes a 
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musician or a musicologist to say what counts as a “candidate” for a variation (see 
Goodman/Elgin 1988: 67).  
An extensional approach does impose serious restrictions on the description of symbolic 
practices, but in doing so it also opens new perspectives. The most promising of these 
perspectives is the comparison of practices across different media, such as the analysis of 
variations, quotations or examples. I will try to show this by looking at Goodman’s analysis 
of a symbolic practice that – though widely used in many different kinds of discourse – has 
generally not received much attention: the giving of examples. 
 
II. Examples 
An example is an instance of a general concept or statement. On the one hand, examples 
guarantee the reality or the applicability of this concept. We might demand clarification or 
even proof by demanding an example for what has been said. On the other hand, we might – 
for the very same reason – dismiss something as superfluous or insufficient by calling it 
‘merely’ an example (as opposed to a general rule).  
Moreover, we think that examples show what cannot be said, that they somehow 
exceed the general concept they exemplify, that there is somehow ‘more’ to them and that 
they render things evident in a way descriptions cannot. And for that very reason they may 
also be misleading: we might even suspect them of conveying too much information, 
irrelevant or contraband information that might encroach on the concept that is exemplified.  
An analysis of examples should address these conflicting impressions and help us to 
decide whether examples are indispensable or not and whether there is ‘more’ to examples or 
not. I shall argue that they are indispensable, that there are different kinds of examples, that, 
indeed, there can be ‘more’ to them, and that an analysis in terms of Goodman’s theory of 
symbols will allow us to see why this is so. In short: Goodman’s theory of symbols allows us 
to disentangle the two different strands of questions that make up traditional approaches to the 
analysis of examples – the question, what distinguishes ‘showing’ from ‘telling’, from the 
question, what makes an example epistemologically productive. And it can operate these 
clarifications by virtue of its strict extensionalism.  
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III. Examples in Kant and Wittgenstein 
Traditionally examples have not been more than a minor object of study in rhetoric and 
epistemology. John Lyons (1989: 4), in his study of examples in Renaissance texts, has called 
the example “metaphor’s forgotten sibling”. And even in the last decades the status of 
examples has not undergone the same revision as that of metaphors. Due to the work of 
Black, Goodman and others metaphors have been recognized to function not only as 
ornaments but also as models, as instruments of cognition. Examples have not received the 
same amount of attention. Roland Barthes wrote that rhetoric as a discipline had often been 
regarded as “ce qui vient après” (Barthes 1994 [1970]: 917) – that is the presentation, the 
dressing-up that comes after the facts have been established. And examples still seem to be 
regarded in this way, as an addition to what has already been said and proven independently. 
This said, examples have made their appearance in philosophical investigations concerning 
the relation between the general and the particular; roughly speaking this has been the case 
wherever in a text the epistemological and the rhetoric dimension overlap. This is, for 
example, the case in a very discreet and almost invisible way in transcendental philosophy, it 
is also the case – and reputedly so – in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy where examples have 
become the centre-piece of philosophical analysis.1 
With Kant and the profound re-conception of epistemology he operates, examples are, 
in a way, rehabilitated by comparison with his predecessors.2 For Kant, of course, concepts 
without intuitions are “void” (“leer”)3; by consequence a central problem of transcendental 
philosophy is how concepts obtain the requisite intuitions, i.e. the problem of “presentation” 
(“Darstellung”).4 Kant establishes the possibility of “presentation” in this sense for four 
different types of concepts: schemata furnish the intuitions for pure concepts of the 
understanding. The schema allows the “application of the category to phenomena”.5 
Mathematical concepts are, likewise, applied a priori – by construction within the pure forms 
of intuition.6 To rational concepts or ideas “no sensible intuition can be adequate”.7 They can 
only be presented in a symbolical manner, by analogy. In this way “the Beautiful is the 
                                                 
1 I have chosen Kant and Wittgenstein and excluded others (namely Aristotle) for argument’s sake; my aim here 
is not to give a historical account of examples in philosophy, but to make certain systematic points on the use of 
examples. 
2 On examples in Wolff see Buck 1971. 
3 Kant 1968 [1781]: A 51/B75, p. 45 of the translation. 
4 Kant 1968 [1790]: § 59. The following reading of Kant is based on Beaufret 1973 and Gabriel 1998. 
5 “die Anwendung der Kategorie auf Erscheinungen“ (Kant 1968 [1781]: A 139/B 178, p. 101 of the translation). 
6 Kant 1968 [1804]: A 183. 
7“[Vernunftbegriffen kann] keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein” (Kant 1968 [1790]: § 59, A 251/B 
255, p. 148 of the translation). 
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symbol of the morally Good”8. Examples, finally, furnish intuitive reality to empirical 
concepts.9 
Of these four terms – schemata, constructions, analogies and examples – two are well-
established within Kant’s terminology: schemata and analogies are the subject of much read 
paragraphs in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgement, respectively; the 
other two, constructions and examples, are rather marginal in Kant’s work. Following the 
interpretations of Jean Beaufret (1973) and Gottfried Gabriel (1998), I think, nevertheless, 
that these four terms form a kind of conceptual grid which is Kant’s answer to the problem of 
‘presentation’ (‘Darstellung’). 
If this is correct, the status of examples in Kant is as follows: examples are 
indispensable to the acquisition of knowledge and they appertain to the domain of intuition. 
They cannot exceed the concepts they comply with – except for the fact that they are real and 
guarantee that these concepts are not void. And within the framework of transcendental 
philosophy they are a minor problem. But – and here again, one could speak of the 
rehabilitation of examples by Kant – the Critique of Pure Reason also advocates a didactic 
use of examples: examples are the “go-cart of the judgement”10, they can demonstrate how 
concepts should be applied.  
In Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations the status of the question of examples is 
very different from the hesitant rehabilitation in transcendental philosophy. In two respects 
examples play a decisive role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: philosophy itself proceeds 
by example not by theoretical construction; and, secondly, examples are crucial for the 
application and formation of concepts. 
Wittgenstein advocates the use of examples in philosophy as an antidote to 
metaphysical aberrations: the description of a real (or at least realistic) language-game will 
sweep away the illusions created by a metaphysical use of language, the description of a 
fictitious language game might demonstrate the absurd consequences of a given theory. By 
giving examples philosophy works as a therapy that will cure us of the perverse desire to ask 
metaphysical questions.11  
                                                 
8 In the original: “das Schöne ist das Symbol des Sittlichguten” (Kant 1968 [1790]: § 59, A 254/ B 258, p. 149 of 
the translation). 
9 See Kant 1968 [1790]: § 59, A 251/B 254, p. 148 of the translation. 
10 Original expression: “Gängelwagen der Urteilskraft” (Kant 1968 [1781]: A 134/B 174, p. 99 of the 
translation). 
11 See e.g. Philosophical Investigations [quoted as PI] §§ 2sqq., Wittgenstein’s most famous fictitious language-
game that demonstrates the shortcomings of the Augustinian picture of language, or § 411 for a ‘therapeutic’ 
reading of realistic language-games. For the different functions of language-games see e.g. Glock 1996: 193sqq. 
This said, whatever his remarks about his own writings suggest, Wittgenstein’s texts are not enumerations of 
examples, and to assert that Wittgenstein’s method consists in proceeding “by example” (see e.g. Kroß 1999: 
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And, moreover, examples play a decisive role in concept formation:  
Suppose I shew someone various multicoloured pictures, and say: “The colour you 
see in all these is called ‘yellow ochre’”. – This is a definition, and the other will get 
to understand it by looking for and seeing what is common to the pictures.” (PI § 72) 
 
By choosing one feature of the example over the others, we establish an open series of 
analogies. This process of selection and abstraction enables us to continue the series, “to go 
on the same way” (PI § 185). 
Wittgenstein thus recognizes the importance of examples in two very different 
contexts: examples are indispensable to philosophical investigation and examples are 
indispensable to ensuring our conceptual hold on the world – the domestic life of a concept is 
a series of examples. I will not, in the present context, discuss the massive implications of this 
reversal for the question of rules in the Philosophical Investigations. For the question of 
examples the consequences are as follows: to choose description over explanation (see PI § 
109), therapy over theory (see PI § 133) implies that examples are productive, that they are an 
integral part of our knowledge of the world, that there is – at the very least – an 
interdependence of showing and telling.  
Kant’s treatment of examples is part of the more general question of ‘presentation’ 
(‘Darstellung’), i.e. the question how concepts relate to intuitions. Examples in Wittgenstein 
are part of an enquiry concerning the nature of philosophical investigation, i.e. the relation 
between rhetoric and logic; and they are part of an enquiry concerning the nature of rules and 
concepts, which means they lead up to a problem of induction. 
 
IV. Goodman’s Analysis of Exemplification  
Goodman takes up the question of exemplification in an entirely different context. In the first 
two chapters of Languages of Art Goodman tackles the question what makes a (pictorial) 
representation a representation of something and the question how a picture expresses an 
emotion. The result of these first two chapters is the distinction between four modes of 
reference: literal or metaphorical denotation and literal or metaphorical exemplification. 
Denotation is the reference of a label (a picture, a predicate etc.) to its instances, 
exemplification is, conversely, “the reference of a sample to a feature of the sample” 
(Goodman 1984: 56), of what is denoted by a certain label to this label. 
                                                                                                                                                        
182 and Gabriel 1998: 243 in an allusion to Philosophical Investigations § 133) is an oversimplification. But 
examples do play a decisive part in Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophical tradition.  
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To define examples in the language of extensionalism changes the face of the 
problem: firstly, in this perspective the giving of examples is in itself a symbolic practice (see 
also Elgin1983: 72) and not what underlies such a practice or anchors it to reality. Secondly, 
exemplification is a kind of reference. This is what distinguishes exemplification from 
instantiation, the mere possession of a property from the showing forth of a property – the 
definition given in Languages of Art is: “exemplification is possession plus reference.” 
(Goodman 1997 [1968]: 53) By consequence, exemplification is “selective” (Goodman 1984: 
59) – i.e. it involves choosing one of the many labels that apply to a given sample. 
Goodman’s example is the tailor’s swatch where a small piece of cloth exemplifies the colour 
and texture of the cloth we are going to buy, but not, say, its size (see Goodman 1997 [1968]: 
53).  
In a Kantian perspective the problem would be to find an example to match the label, 
in a Wittgensteinian perspective the problem would be to see how we manage to go on from 
one example to the next. In an extensional perspective, these different approaches would 
simply correspond to different uses of examples.  
 
V. Sketching some of the Consequences 
For a quick sketch of an extensional approach I would like to begin with the question of 
intuition. What do we mean, when we say that an example ‘shows’ something? Are examples 
(as opposed to ‘concepts’) in someway iconic? How does a theory of symbols define 
‘showing’ as opposed to ‘telling’? If exemplification is defined by the direction of reference, 
it is obvious that being an example (as opposed to a denotation) and being an image (as 
opposed to, say, a verbal description) involve distinctions in different dimensions of 
description: iconicity does not depend on the direction of reference, but rather on how this 
reference operates. Goodman does not define iconicity, but establishes ‘density’ and 
‘repleteness’ of representation as typical features of the pictorial (Goodman/Elgin:1988: 
130sq.). ‘Density’ refers to the fact that there is no way of deciding which of two labels refers 
to an object (Goodman 1997 [1968]: 136, 153), because characters “merge into one another, 
and so also for what is denoted” (Goodman 1984: 57). ‘Repleteness’ refers to the fact that in 
understanding the symbol in question we have to take into account a wealth of aspects and 
that we do not know beforehand which of them are relevant (see Goodman 1997 [1968]: 
229sq.). Both properties would be typically present in a painting and typically absent in a 
(musical) score. But neither has to do with the direction of reference. If this is correct, then 
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some examples, but not all of them, will be dense, some dense and replete, and some of those, 
but not all of them, will be pictorial. Furthermore, those that are dense (but not necessarily 
replete) could be said to ‘show’ something. There is no terminological distinction in 
Goodman between ‘telling’ and ‘showing’, but in Languages of Art there is a passing remark 
to the effect that ‘showing’ as opposed to ‘telling’ implies both exemplification and density 
(see Goodman 1997 [1968]: 253). Some examples, then, show something, others do not.  
To say that exemplification is a mode of reference and that the question, what 
distinguishes ‘showing’ from ‘telling’, is not the same as the question, what distinguishes an 
example from an image, has, I think, three consequences that indicate what aspects to look out 
for in an analysis of examples. 
Firstly, exemplificational systems can be digital or analog or anything in between. 
That is (if you pardon the oversimplification), examples can be used in a ‘Kantian’ way (as 
proofs of existence, as proofs that a given empirical concept is not void) and in a 
‘Wittgensteinian’ way. ‘Saying’ would be what denotational systems like languages or 
notations do, ‘showing’ would refer to semantically dense exemplificational systems – with 
the two other positions in the grid taken by analog denotational systems and ‘Kantian’ 
examples. Examples, then, have different functions; to say that something is an example is not 
to name its function in discourse but its mode of reference. 
An extensional analysis thus links the description of examples to a description of their 
context: the distinction between digital and analog symbol systems is not one of inherent 
properties, it is a consequence of our habitual ways of using these symbols (see Goodman 
1997 [1968]: 158).  
If exemplification is defined by direction of reference, the second consequence is, that 
we will have to determine the referential chains involved, when we want to describe what 
kind of cognitive challenge the use of a given example poses. We might start out with a label 
and look for an example-as-proof-of-existence, or we may start out with examples and search 
for a symbol system and labels to fit them. But before we determine which step is the critical 
one, we will have to retrace the referential chains. These might be more complex than 
suspected. Take the simple case of ostensive definition: you teach someone the German word 
for ‘apple’ by pointing to the drawing of an apple. The picture obviously denotes the apple, 
but: does the picture exemplify the verbal label or does the apple exemplify both the picture 
and the verbal label? Neither is a very good description: technically speaking the picture 
could exemplify the verbal label metaphorically, but it is more plausible to say that both the 
picture and the verbal label are instances of a third label, the label ‘apple-representations’ 
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which is exemplified by the picture and in turn denotes the verbal label – in other words: “a 
term is applied not to what it denotes, but to what it mentions” (Elgin 1983: 47), the term 
‘apple’ “applies mention-selectively” (Elgin 1983: 47) to the apple-picture. In this way a very 
simple given practice is based on a two step referential chain (picture to the label ‘apple 
representations’ to verbal label). The critical point in the ostensive definition is obviously the 
first step in the chain, from the picture to the label ‘apple-representations’. Our understanding 
of the definition depends on our choice of the appropriate label for the picture. And as readers 
of Wittgenstein we already know, that, here again, the context plays a crucial role (see PI § 
28-32). In this way, the identification of the referential chain(s) and of the critical points (i.e. 
the distinction of what is given and what has to be added in our understanding of the example) 
is an important part of the description of a given symbolic practice. 
The third consequence, that can be drawn from Goodman’s distinction between 
showing and telling, concerns the question whether there is ‘more’ to examples than 
‘instantiation plus reference’; and if so, whether this applies exclusively to examples that are 
semantically dense; and whether this explains how it is possible that examples that are 
logically equivalent (that is both instantiations of the label in question), are not rhetorically 
equivalent, are not equally good examples.  
What difference does it make when the exemplificational system in place is dense? 
Density and repleteness of exemplificational systems account for the difference between 
showing and telling, for everything that is ‘more’ in giving an example. That an 
exemplificational system is semantically dense means that – by definition – we cannot decide 
with certainty which symbol exemplifies a label (see Goodman 1997 [1968]: 239 and Elgin 
1983: 122). In the case of the ostensive definition by picture that means not only that there 
could be borderline cases, that might or might not exemplify the label in question. It also 
means that we might not know which traits of the exemplifying representation are relevant for 
the reference to be successful. Even if we have been told what the label is, we are still in a 
(‘Wittgensteinian’) situation where we have to continue the series – and in order to do that we 
will try to figure out what other labels are relevant and can be used to determine what counts 
as an example for the label in question. But, as Goodman points out, not all examples are 
good examples. A good example requires ‘projectibility’, i.e. it must be representative 
(Goodman 1978: 133sqq.).  
This brings us to the question of prototypes and the risk of what I have called 
‘contraband’ information. In situations where we have to decide whether a sample is 
projectible, or which of its traits are projectible, we decide on a set of labels, not a single 
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label. And this selection of additional labels as exemplified and as projectible depends largely 
on the wider framework of accepted practices.  
In a semantically dense system examples might thus serve as useful prototypes or – 
because we are looking for potential prototypes and a wider framework of accepted practices 
– trigger ‘mythological’ (see Barthes 1993 [1957]) connotations, clichés.12 It will therefore be 
essential for an analysis of examples to name the cue(s), such as representational conventions, 
their transgression, the situational context etc. that determine the choice of projectible labels. 
An extensional approach – that determines referential chains, distinguishes digital and 
analog exemplificational systems, and notes where cues are needed to identify the labels 
exemplified – such an approach places the practice of giving examples into contexts and 
connects it to functional hypotheses. I think this is a useful point of departure for the analysis 
of examples and other symbolic practices. 
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